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Fiscal Incentives and Direct Foreign Investment in Less Developed Countries
By David Lim*
This study found no support for the belief by the governments of most less developed
countries (LDCs) that the provision of ﬁscal incentives is necessary to attract direct foreign
investment and that the greater the generosity of these incentive programmes the greater
would be the level of such investment. What muttered were the presence of natural
resources and a proven record of economic performance. The provision of incentives could
not compensate for the absence of either of these two factors. The study is a cross-sectional
one of 27 LDCs for the period 1965-73.
I
Almost all the governments of less developed countries (LDCs) provide ﬁscal incentives in
the belief that these encourage a higher level of direct foreign investment. A corollary of
this is the belief that the greater the generosity of the incentive programme, the greater will
be the level of direct foreign investment attracted. Thus if F measures the level of direct
foreign investment and IG the generosity of the incentive package, then,
F = f1(IG)

(1)

where F and IG are expected to be positively related.
At the same time it is argued that the level of direct foreign investment will also be
enhanced by the presence of natural resources and by a proven record of economic
performance. Thus if ME measures the availability of natural resources and ED and GR the
level of economic development and the rate of economic growth respectively, equation (1)
can be expanded to
F = f2(IG,ME,ED,GR)

(2)

where F is expected to be positively related to ME, ED and GR.
Of course, the position taken by the governments of most LDCs is usually not stated as
explicitly as this. However, estimating equation (2) does represent fairly the stand implicitly
taken by most of these governments. Differences may arise over the relative importance of
the various determinants but all assume that the provision of tax incentives to be a
necessary, though not sufficient, condition for attracting direct foreign investment.
II
Equation (2) was used to test the validity of these ideas for a group of twenty seven LDCs for
the period 1965-73.1 F is measured by the average of the annual per capita total direct
foreign investment for the period 1965-73 in US dollars.
IG is a dummy variable for the generosity of the incentive package offered by the LDC.
Incentives can be divided conveniently into three groups. The ﬁrst is the pure tax holiday,
which exempts ﬁrms from the prevailing corporate tax for a certain period. The second is a
modiﬁed tax holiday, whose duration and therefore value depends on the investment level.

The third category consists of cost-lowering incentives, of which the accelerated
depreciation allowance. the investment allowance, and the investment subsidy are the most
common.
It has been argued that if the provision of tax incentives does stimulate direct foreign
investment, then the granting of cost-lowering incentives has a greater stimulative effect
than the granting of the pure or the modiﬁed tax holiday.2 First, tax holidays provide a
‘perverse' subsidy, providing little assistance when assistance is needed (that is, for ﬁrms
making little or no proﬁts) and a great deal of assistance when assistance is not needed
(that is, for ﬁrms making a great deal of proﬁts). Second, their time—perspective is too
limited. It is granted under the assumption that ﬁrms maximize proﬁts in the short-run and
that such proﬁt expectations are formulated clearly enough for the effects of the tax holiday
to be considered meaningfully. Finns which extend their investment plans over a long period
may not ﬁnd any incentive in having tax exemption over the normal period of two to ﬁve
years. If the exemption period is extended over a time-span over which most of these ﬁrms
become proﬁtable. then the exemption becomes meaningless in terms of need. These ﬁrms
may thus ﬁnd cost-lowering incentives to be more attractive. These incentives are granted
with a much longer and a much less precise proﬁt—perspective in mind as they are meant
primarily to lower the costs of production in the often difficult early years of operation.
Third, unlike the cost-lowering incentives the tax holiday offers little incentive to risky
investment programmes as the subsidy it provides only materializes when proﬁts are made.
These considerations of time-perspectives and risks may have special relevance in attracting
private foreign investment. The implicit assumption behind granting tax holidays to private
foreign investors is that they require maximum proﬁts in the short-run and that a relief from
the normal incidence of corporate taxation is the most efficient way of achieving this and
hence of maximizing the ﬂow of foreign investment capital. This assumption may be
justiﬁed for those small ﬁrms which are neither subsidiaries nor associates of large
international companies but may not be consistent with the rationale of the investment
decisions of a large number of ﬁrms with international interests.
These considerations suggest the following measure of 1G. A value of 1 is given to each of
the 27 LDCs that provide tax holidays in the pure or the modiﬁed form. while a value of 2 is
given to each of those that provide cost- lowering incentives. Some of the LDCs offer both
tax holidays and cost- lowering incentives. A value of 3 is given to each one of these: other
things being equal, the more diverse the types of incentives given the larger the range of
motives satisﬁed and so the larger the number of investors attracted. Thus LDCs which give
the most generous package of incentives will be assigned the value 3 in the measurement of
IG, those with the second most generous the value 2 and those with the least generous the
value 1.3 F and IG are expected by the governments of LDCs to be positively related.
ME is the average of the annual percentage shares of minerals in the LDCs total
merchandise exports over the period 1965-73. It was ‘used to test for the inﬂuence of the
availability of non-human resources in attracting direct foreign investment. F and ME are
expected to be positively related.
Two variables were used to capture the inﬂuence of proven economic performance in
attracting direct foreign investment. The ﬁrst is ED, the level of economic development in

the period prior to the investment being made. Other things being equal, the higher .the
level of economic development, the greater the domestic market and the better the
infrastructural facilities and so the greater the opportunities for making proﬁts and the
incentive to invest. ED is measured by the average of the per capita GDP in US dollars, at
1967-69 market prices and exchange rates, for the period 1960-65. It is expected to be
positively related to F.
The second variable is GR, the rate of economic growth. The argument is that, ceteris
paribus, a more rapidly growing economy provides greater proﬁt opportunities than an
economy that is growing slowly or not at all. Foreign investors may ﬁnd it ﬁnancially
attractive to invest in a LDC with a low per capita income that has experienced rapid
economic growth recently. The recent favourable economic performance may reﬂect the
adoption of more rational policies by the government and may offset the adverse effect that
a low per capita income, the result of past neglect and inefficiency, has on investment. Of
course, a LDC with a high per capita income and rapid economic growth will be preferred to
one that enjoys only one of the two attributes. The economic performance variable is
measured in two ways. The ﬁrst is the average annual growth rate of the real per capita GDP
over the period 1960-65 (GR1). The second, the average annual growth rate of the real GDP
over the period 1960-65 (GR2), is a much less demanding measure of economic
performance but may still be useful as it indicates the direction that the economy must go
before improvements in the average standard of living can be brought about. GR, and GR,
are expected to be positively related to F.
The following equations were obtained, by ordinary least squares, using the logarithmic
formulation of equation (2):

The ﬁgures in parentheses are r values and statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.005 and 0.01
conﬁdence levels are indicated by * and ** respectively.
The coefficients of ME are positive. as expected, and statistically signiﬁcant. This conﬁrms
the view that the presence of natural resources is an important factor in persuading foreign
investors to invest in LDCs.

The Coefficients of ED and GR came out with the expected positive sign but only those for
ED are signiﬁcant. This suggests that foreign investors were more concerned with proven
economic performance over a long period of time (which produces a high per capita
income) than with recent economic performance (which produces a high growth rate over
the period concerned) in deciding whether or not to invest.
The coefficients of IG appeared with the totally unexpected negative sign and, equally
important. were statistically signiﬁcant. These results, together with those for ME and ED.
suggest that for those LDCs which offered generous tax incentives. the level of direct foreign
investment was discouraged beyond the level that was determined by the lack of natural
resources and general economic growth. In other words, ﬁscal hyper- generosity was seen
by potential foreign investors as a danger signal (a disincentive) and not as a lure (an
incentive).
A closer look at the results shows, however, that this interpretation is a rather extreme one.
A more reasonable explanation may be found in a recent paper by Shah and Toye [1978].4
After a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature. they concluded that the
effectiveness of ﬁscal incentives in increasing the level of investment in LDCs was either
slight or unknown. They. therefore. found it rather strange that ﬁscal incentives were used
so extensively in LDCs and offered some interesting explanations for this ‘apparent
paradox’.
One of these explanations may be called the illusory compensating effect. It centres round
the intense efforts by the LDCs lacking in resource endowments and technological and
labour skills to encourage direct foreign investment. In order to compensate for the lack of
such resources these countries offer investment incentives. and competition among them
over time results in ever more generous incentives being given. According to Shah and Toye.
‘as this happens. the foreign ﬁrms decide where and how much to invest in accordance with
non-tax criteria, knowing that they will pay precious little to the exchequer wherever they
go’.5 Thus the compensating effect is only an illusory one.
According to this explanation. the provision of incentives per se does not encourage a
higher level of direct foreign investment. It is the influence of non-tax factors that matters.
In the symbols used in this paper. the illusory compensating effect can be represented by
the following two hypotheses:
(1) F is positively related to ME and ED because direct foreign investment is
determined by non-tax factors;
(2) IG is inversely related to ME and ED because the absence of natural resources
and economic growth encourages LDCs to be extra generous in the incentives
they provide.
The inverse and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between F and IG can be derived as a
logical implication of the above two hypotheses. Thus, if F is positively related to ME and ED,
and IG is negatively related to ME and ED, then F and IG are negatively related. Presented in
this way, the inverse relationship between F and IG is purely a statistical one, and has no
behavioural signiﬁcance in its own right. On balance, the Shah-Toye hypothesis of the

illusory compensating effect appears more acceptable than the hypothesis that foreign
investors see ﬁscal hyper-generosity as a sign of economic desperation and so tend to= stay
shy of those LDCs which offer the most generous incentives.
For the analysis as a whole, the values of the F-ratio show that the two regression equations
are statistically signiﬁcant. The values of the adjusted coefficient of determination (R2) are
not particularly low for cross-country studies of this nature. That they are not higher may be
explained by the fact that certain of the determinants most frequently mentioned by
foreign investors have not been included in the estimating equation. The most important of
these are political stability, the provision of favourable terms for the transfer of proﬁts and
the repatriation of capital, freedom from detailed and burdensome bureaucratic control,
and the formulation and the implementation of a development plan. The data for these
variables are not available and when they are they cannot be quantiﬁed easily or
meaningfully.
III
The results suggest that there is some support for Shah-Toye’s illusory compensating effect
in explaining the widespread use of incentives in spite of their slight or unknown stimulative
effect on direct foreign investment.
However, this must remain a tentative conclusion in view of a number of limitations of the
study. First, the sample of LDCs used is rather small and could have done with a few more
countries that offer only cost-lowering incentives. Second, the method used in measuring
the generosity of the incentives granted is rather crude, so that the ﬁgures obtained for the
regression coefﬁcients of 1G must be interpreted with care. In defence of the measure used,
it can be said that the actual cost of ﬁscal incentives to the exchequer is usually totally
invisible and it is very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain reliable estimates of such costs
for even a ‘smallish’ group of 27 LDCs.
NOTES
1. These are Afghanistan (1), Bangladesh (3). Barbados (3), Ecuador (3), Fiji (3), Ghana
(1), Guyana (3), India (3), Indonesia (1), Ivory Coast (1), Jamaica (3), Malaysia (3),
Mauritius (1), Niger (1), Nigeria (1), Pakistan (3), Paraguay (1), Peru (1), Senegal (1).
Sierra Leone (1), Singapore (3). Sri Lanka (3), Sudan (1), Tanzania (2), Trinidad and
Tobago (3), Uruguay (1), and Zambia (2). The data for the analysis came from the
World Bank [1976]. For an explanation of the number inserted after each country.
see note 3.
2. See Fromm [197]]. and Bird and Oldman [I975].
3. The type of incentives given by each of the 27 countries in the sample is indicated by
the number after each of the LDCs listed in note 1. The 27 LDCS have been chosen
for our analysis because there is a very detailed and systematic description of the
incentives offered by these countries in Shah and Toye [1 978]. This description
enables a meaningful classiﬁcation of the LDCS by the type of incentives offered.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 285.
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